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Abstract With the emergence of service provisioning environments and new
networking capabilities, antagonistic businesses have been able to collaborate
securely by sharing information in order to have a beneficial result for all. This
collaboration has sometimes been imposed by state legislation and sometimes been
desirable by the firms themselves so as to resolve frequently occurring abnormal-
ities. In any case, as information exchange takes place between antagonistic firms,
security and privacy issues arise. In the context of this paper, a collaborative
environment has been analyzed for enterprises that set out in the banking sector. A
Grid-based Anti-Money Laundering (AML) system has been developed in an effort
to take advantage of the Grid infrastructure, supporting the secure and trustful
exchange of information between financial institutions and ensuring the confiden-
tiality of the data transferred and the authentication of the users to whom they are
available. Special emphasis is put on security mechanisms for supporting identity
and privacy management as well as in Service Level Agreements (SLA) enforcement
for enabling a trust enforcement platform in a collaboration business model.
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Introduction
Collaboration that requires information exchange at a business level is a very
sensitive area, especially when it is to be implemented within a competitive market
frame. Competition is hindering the development of strategic partnerships and a
complicated framework is required so as to maintain trust across all collaborating
members whose activities can be cooperating or non-cooperating e.g. antagonistic,
cheating or even malicious.
The benefit from building business partnerships is summarized in the mindset: By
sharing we gain more. Strategic alliances enable businesses to gain competitive
advantage through access to a partner’s resources, including markets, technologies,
capital and people. Fast growing companies rely heavily on alliances to extend their
technical and operational resources. In the process, they save time and boost
productivity by not having to develop their own, from scratch. Any such
collaboration involves interactions, knowledge sharing and information exchange.
However, even though collaboration between the organizations that are involved
in a supply chain has been studied (e.g. (lacovou et al. 1995; Cachón and Fisher
2000; Mukhopadhyay et al. 1995; Porterfield 2008)) and to some markets realized,
little work has been done in the case where antagonistic firms are collaborating by
sharing information so as to achieve a common goal (which is not to build trust with
intent to monopolize business (Moody 1904), that is, to create a cartel). Even though
it is unusual, cases where information exchange between antagonistic organizations
is required exist. In general, there are two conditions that constitute prerequisites for
this case to hold: a) the organizations of a specific sector are imposed to involve a
specific business process in their existing ones that delivers no direct benefit to them
but only loss, and b) the business process’ performance is improved, the cost reduced
and the organisations will have a long-term benefit in their reputation through
collaboration. Of course, this is a very rare case and is the one that this paper studies.
On the downside, while organizations may choose to exchange information with their
competing partners in order to improve performance and reduce costs, theymust balance
the risks associated with providing information that can be used against them. Access to
corporate data or even sensitive data belonging to third parties (e.g. the customers), may
lead not only to a competitive disadvantage but also to legal issues. Information
exchange then becomes a double-edged sword where it is a source of efficiency in
implementing the business process but can allow firms to act selfishly.
SOA and Grids allow the creation of trusted environments for information
exchange between competitive organizations making sure not to compromise private
information or corporate secrets, as well as, not to expose the business to
competition hazards. More importantly, using this technology it is made possible
to not compromise sensitive private data along with the identity of the owner, but to
partly expose information and only in the case of a true positive, to expose identity.
This paper focuses on presenting a system that has been developed in order to enable
to competitive organizations that set out in the banking sector to collaborate using Grid
technologies. The principle behind its operation is the trust establishment through long
term application SLAs that are agreed by the executives of each bank (e.g. Chief
Compliance Officers). The claimed breakthrough is that the risk management details
expressed in these long term SLAs are reflected along with other technical terms in
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short/medium termed technical SLAs. Furthermore, we exploit the properties of Grids in
order to establish a dynamic security framework, at all the levels of the information
exchange process. Finally, the proposed system achieves to manage identity so as to not
compromise it at any point. This system is named Anti-Money Laundering in Grids
(AMONG) and it is a product of the BEinGRID IST project (Business Experiment in
Grid (BEinGRID IST), www.beingrid.eu).
In what follows, the paper presents the market on which the problem of
establishing trustful collaborations appears (“Background: anti-money laundering”),
and it introduces the technical solution for the trust enforcement and the Grid
security mechanisms for identity management (“Technical solution”). Finally the
paper explains the merit of this solution in the business world and presents the
alternatives for resolving the same problem (“Evaluation—stress tests”).
Background: anti-money laundering
Since the attacks on the US (Sep’01), Madrid (Mar’04) and London (Jul’05), anti-
terrorism has risen to the top of the security agenda in Europe. Much debate, various
action plans, numerous communications and several concrete developments have
taken place at EU level with their main focus being on tackling the international
problem of money laundering. Among actions proposed lies the 3rd Anti-Money
Laundering (AML) Directive (Official Journal of the European Union 2005) which
implements the 49 Recommendations produced by the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) in 2003 (Financial Action Task Force (FATF). http://www.fatf-gafi.org),
aiming to combat money laundering and terrorism financing, by providing information
deriving from financial institutions concerning suspicious or unusual activities as
indication of money laundering, and extending its scope to transactions with potential
relation to financing terrorism. Directive 2005/60/EC—which constitutes the manifes-
tation of Proposal COM(2004)448 (Proposal for a Directive on the prevention of the
use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, COM(2004)448)—
has, thus, re-formed the definition of money laundering as manipulation of money
derived from crime (activities that try to either legalize money gained out of illegal
activities or hide their legal origin) or collection of legitimate money or property for
terrorist purposes. The 3rd Money Laundering Directive is the first concrete step that
extends an obligation to monitor transactions beyond banks to third parties such as tax
advisors, auditors, real estate agencies, notaries, insurance intermediaries etc. Member
States are currently in the stage of implementing the directive. All European banks
have to preserve AML systems and Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures in order
to comply with European and national legislation. When other institutions start
implementing AML solutions, the AML market is expected to broaden significantly.
The following figure depicts the positioning of applications and service for
Financial Services Providers (Redshaw and Furlonger 2006) (Fig. 1):
Technologies installed in Financial Institutions fall into these main management
categories:
& Client
& Information
& Transaction
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The figure shows how these categories can be positioned for business and IT
focus at Financial Institutions. Client management is the category that offers the
greatest potential for growing the business—for most banks in the EU—and is the
most likely to use applications that are built in-house, because there is a wide array
of competitive differentiation. On the other hand, transaction management focuses
on achieving compliance with the regulated aspects of contemporary legislation and
has therefore little potential for growing the business. Finally, information
management stands somewhere in-between, with some potential for business growth
and a blend of in-house applications, third-party packages and outsourced services.
The starting point for current anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism
measures is accurate and cost effective monitoring of transactions at a very
large scale (in major financial institutions this could be in the region of 5–20
million transactions per day) using AML Systems administrated by Compliance
Officers (CO) in each financial institution. The collected data must be reported to
the appropriate intelligence agencies and the whole process must comply with
international regulations such as the 3rd Directive, and national regulations such
as the USA PATRIOT Act.
The identification of the origin of transactions by financial institutions is a
complex process that requires transformation of the data, which is impractical due to
the large volumes of data involved. The ability of companies to collect transaction
data has outstripped their ability to analyse it. Thus financial institutions depend on
profiling to predict ‘normal’ behaviour, and look first for anomalies that may signify
suspicious activity. Typical profiling methods include data mining, neural networks,
statistical analyses, link-analysis, etc. The effectiveness of this approach depends on
the context in which the technology is applied. The main limitation of current
commercially available implementations is that they focus on analysing those
financial transactions that reside within isolated financial institutions. The rules used
to define anomalies are set locally, and when transactions trigger alarms, they are
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Fig. 1 Positioning of applications and service for financial service providers
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investigated by the bank’s own AML analysis team. Thus the detection of anomalies
is not done in a consistent way across all financial institutions, and there is no
automated correlation that could inform the construction of risk-based and trust-
based models to fully implement the new EU directive.
So, existing systems offer only intra-bank automated AML analysis with inter-
organisational communication being initiated only in case of anomaly detection
restricting this way the monitoring process only to simple fraud detection, whereas
the detection of complex illegal financial activities still remain an extremely time-
consuming and costly process. This paper exploits Grid, in order to bring a new,
widely adopted solution into the market, which will enable the exchange of essential
information on suspicious customers. Through this process banks will be able to
evaluate ML alarms more accurately, thus increasing ML detection percentages
(industry standard is 5%–7%) and reducing the load of produced Suspicious
Transactions Reports. The described process will take place in a secure and
commonly trusted environment that will protect sensitive data of customers and will
not expose data that could be exploited due to competition factors.
The process described in the aforementioned scenario will allow banks to engage
in a rewarding procedure that will positively affect both institutions’ compliance
mechanisms. This effect is interpreted to:
& Increase the efficiency of AML procedures.
& Decrease the risk of reputation damage.
The final outcome constitutes a solution for more effective Money Laundering
detection, based on existing AML software (e.g. MoneyWatch (Money Watch®,
Anti-Money Laundering solution, http://www.exodussa.com/Default.aspx?
id=1103&nt=19&lang=2) developed by EXODUS S.A.), currently installed in the
banks’ premises, and their collaborative operation through a Grid middleware
service. In general this service enables banks (different or subsidiaries banks) to
exchange information so as to improve the success rate of the AML application
deployed to each bank. This information exchange is currently taking place in an
informal way and it is based on trustful relations between people. The service that is
offered, allows the banks to achieve information exchange in an automated, cost-
efficient way and through secure and trustful communication channels. Each bank
inside this collaboration environment is obligated through legal contracts to be
trustworthy and reveal the real customer data requested, in order to achieve a
beneficial result for all. Αt the same time, they all desire an inter-bank Anti-Money
Laundering Framework working properly, in order to detect ML activity more
efficiently and avoid huge fines by the regulators.
As mentioned, the solution uses existing commercialised products. The
application of Grid, though, adds significant innovation, since it allows information
exchange between financial institutions for the first time, thus making ML detection
and prevention more effective and more efficient. The commercialised application
triggers the dissemination of Grid potential in a market, where key players and end-
users have not considered the respective advantages yet. Potential customers, namely
financial institutions and, in due time, insurance companies, accountants and other
end-users (as imposed by the 3rd ML Directive), will receive a faster and more
efficient AML solution. The solution contributes significantly to both the avoidance
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of compliance penalties, and the decrease of reputation risk. These benefits are
provided to the customers at much lower prices, than the ones that characterize
contemporary AML products.
Given that the information exchange between financial institutions concerns
transactional data of high sensitivity, such as personal user data, client assets etc
issues of security and trust between collaborating banks arise. Access to data
belonging to third parties such as customers should be controlled by the system and
security components must enforce data encryption and secure inter-banking
communication, in order to ensure client data integrity and safety. Personal data
exchange also has to do with ethical and legal issues and was a crucial factor of the
presented solution. In Greece, the National Bank of Greece has recently issued
Decision No. 281 (“ISOCRATIS”, the Greek Bank of Legal Information in the
Internet http://www.dsanet.gr/Epikairothta/Nomothesia/apof281_09.htm), which
constitutes the transposition of the 3rd EU Directive into national law, stating that
the information exchange between Financial Institutions is allowed, as long as it
refers to the same customer. The Directive is also expected to influence legislation in
most European countries in the following period. Furthermore, another occurring
problem is the risk of malicious use of collaboration privileges and access to
corporate data for competition purposes. In this case, the Service Level Agreements
between banks and the system monitoring components must prevent potential
phishing attacks and corporate data access abuse.
Therefore, amongst the non-functional requirements of the software there are
understandably many security requirements:
& All messages between financial institutions must be encrypted and signed to
ensure data confidentiality and integrity.
& Access to each bank’s data should be controlled by limiting inter-bank queries, to
make sure that the data are used only for Money Laundering detection, rather
than competition purposes.
& Each financial institution should only gain access to the Grid service under a
specific account, as a result of a long-term service level agreement.
& The system should interact only with authenticated and authorized entities (users,
external systems).
& The system should manage user authentication from heterogeneous
authenticating systems.
Technical solution
Using grid in business collaboration
In the present section, a Grid-based Anti-Money Laundering system will be
presented in an effort to take advantage of the Grid as an infrastructure supporting
the analysis of transactions within a single bank but between organizations as well,
bringing this way AML technologies closer to meeting new regulatory obligations.
Issues of trust, security and operational management have been investigated both
from the technical and business perspective.
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By using Grid services, it is possible to overcome the fundamental limitation
of the development of AML solutions that are meant to operate in a standalone
basis. Such a Grid service allows financial institutions to extend and correlate
their analysis methods using information from other institutions and also from
their own business partners and customers. The following specific technical
innovations are demonstrated in the AMONG solution:
& dynamic Grid security mechanisms provide a consistent framework for creating
trusted networks that may span national boundaries, and allow a bank to provide
secure access to AML information;
& dynamic Grid service level agreements allow the bank to define the level of
access they can support, and implement service management methods to respond
rapidly to requests without their resources becoming over-extended;
& interoperable Web Service specifications allow seamless data exchange,
facilitating the tracing of suspicious transactions and the correlation of data
from different sources.
The resulting capabilities allow enhanced due diligence based on a secure exchange of
information between the bank and other institutions. Themiddleware that is used is GRIA
(Service Oriented Collaborations for Industry and Commerce, www.gria.org) which is
the first Grid middleware designed from the start for commercial inter-enterprise service
provision, and supports dynamic trust management and Service Level Agreement
(SLA)-based management features. GRIA is a service-oriented infrastructure designed
to support B2B collaborations through service provisioning across organisational
boundaries in a secure, interoperable and flexible manner, using Web Service protocols
based on key interoperability specifications and is available free and open source.
In our case, Grid technology and especially GRIA enables secure communication,
using GRIA Security Components between financial organizations and provides
SLA mechanisms for setting long term agreements between the two parts on
authentication and acquiring limited access to each bank resources. The main
implementation work that was required to create an experimental prototype consisted
of deployment of the AML application within this infrastructure, and development of
appropriate SLAs and corresponding monitoring, evaluation and accounting
mechanisms. GRIA 5.3 provides many facilities of use in the current solution:
& a trade account service that supports setting up trade accounts (i.e. billing
relationships) with a service provider, which can be used to keep track of consumers’
credit limits and amounts owed, store policies for who can access services billed to
each trade account, and validate service requests against these policies;
& an SLA management service that supports defining SLA offerings (known as SLA
Templates in GRIA), and requests for SLA, based on these offerings, which can be
used to keep track of and constrain service usage, store policies for who can access
services under each SLA, and validate service requests against these policies;
& a service development kit that includes a Policy Decision Point (PDP) for storing
dynamically updatable access policies local to each developed service, and a Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) that consults the local PDP and can also check whether a
request is acceptable in the context of a billing relationship or SLA by validating
security tokens using a trade account service or SLA management service;
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& a client development kit that provides a graphical interface for managing GRIA
resources (i.e. trade accounts and SLAs as well as application-specific resources)
and accessing them through an invocation engine which can be configured to
obtain the client’s X.509 identity, Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
assertions regarding group membership and tokens representing federations in a
flexible manner.
Main AMONG scenario
To present the architecture we first provide the main scenario of AMONG, so that
the reader can get a better understanding of the modules used in the architecture. A
simple scenario is consisted of two banks: the first bank needs to query the second
bank about a customer suspected of performing Money Laundering activities and get
his personal details to ensure it is the same person, as well as his risk score
(a number indicative of the possibility of him being a Money-Launderer), with the
system performing some sort of mapping, so that it corresponds to a common climax
for all collaborators. In real life more than two collaborators will be involved, as the
first bank will be able to query multiple Financial Institutions at a time, having a
different Service Level Agreement with each one of them. The AML information
received by each bank will be subject to further analysis by the AML System of the
first bank, taking into account the trustworthiness and reliability of each other bank,
to conclude to a concrete profile and risk assessment of the customer in question.
However, only two banks are shown here just for simplification purposes.
Firstly, we will describe the functionality of the AMONG solution, in order to present
the service workflow. Then we will provide the main components used in the
architecture, including GRIA and AML product components. We consider two Banks,
namely Bank X and Bank Y. The following design uses X as the service provider bank
and Bank Yas the client. In a real deployment, Bank Y would use the AML Services of
many banks and would also provide an AML Service to other banks. The multiplicity
and symmetry of the relationships is not shown in the figures or generally mentioned in
the text to avoid complicating the explanations. The Compliance Officer (CO) of Bank
Y, using the Bank’s internal AML system, has identified a suspicious customer (or
potential customer). He wants to see whether the particular customer has also been
identified as suspicious by Bank X—a fact that would solidify Bank Y’s information on
the customer’s risk score. The overview of the scenario is depicted in Fig. 2. The CO
initiates a request to Bank X using the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) number of the
investigated person to ask for the customer’s details for verification purposes. Bank X
checks whether Bank Y has access to its database, based on a X.509 keystore and
Account Management mechanisms, ensures the queries performed have not reached
the limit and can reply in the two following ways:
& No information: The statement can either imply that the particular person cannot
be found in the bank’s records or that the particular customer has a risk score
below a commonly agreed threshold (e.g. “high”). This way the bank can protect
other institutions from querying all of its customer records.
& Customer details: The system returns the customer’s full name, date of birth and
country of residence to Bank Y.
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The system at Bank Y performs an automatic check on the personal details to
confirm that they match the locally-held records. This is to ensure that Bank X and
Bank Y are communicating about the same person. If the Bank Y AML system
detects an inconsistency in the received data, the CO of Bank Y will move on with a
manual analysis and check whether this differentiation constitutes fraudulent
behaviour or the IRS number is false. This process could be time consuming (due
to the involvement of manual analysis), and is out of the scope of this paper.
If the matching of the data is successful, then the AML system of Bank Y will ask for
the risk score of the customer. Bank Xwill return the risk score in a normalised form that
allows the mapping of the score to that used by Bank Y’s AML system. This way the
service guarantees interoperability among different AML solutions. Once the risk score
is received, the CO at BankYwill use it to inform the decision about what risk score will
the bank give the customer itself. This is not an automatic process.
Architecture
To implement the above scenario a loosely coupled service oriented architecture has
been designed. The following figure (Fig. 3) shows a typical deployment of an AML
product, along with the additional components required. For simplification purposes
the client has only been shown at Bank Y and the service at Bank X. It is expected
that both banks would install both the client and the service to provide service to
each other in a symmetrical manner. Also, only a few of the AML components have
been shown at Bank Y.
Bank Y Bank X
getDetails(customer)
Full name, birthdate, country
Compare details with local info
getRisk()
normalised risk
Check user, check SLA
Fig. 2 Overview of the main interaction between the client and service banks
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In brief, the components are:
Service provider (Bank X)
○ A generic AML product providing some internal web services.
○ The additional components required to provide an external AML service,
hosted on a Windows or Linux Application Server:
○ The GRIA Trade Account Service: the account service defines the root of
trust between two banks and keeps track of any charges made by the
service bank to the client bank for using the AML Service. It provides the
ability for a client to request an account, for the service provider to
approve/deny requests and for both sides to manage accounts.
○ The GRIA SLA Service: the SLA service defines the service level
agreement between the service and client bank and manages the AML
Service, ensuring that the usage of the AML Service does not exceed the
Application Server
(Windows or Linux)
Web App Container
(Tomcat or JBoss)
GRIA SLA Service
GRIA AML Service
SOAP/ HTTPS / Internal 
GRIA Account Service
SOAP/ HTTPS / Internal 
Central Bank Server
Application Server
Web App Container
AML Case Manager
Transaction Data Transaction Data
FTP / LAN
Module
AML Policy Manager 
Module
AML Data Loader 
Module
Browser Client
Web Browser
SOAP / HTTPS / Internet
SOAP / HTTPS / Internet
Domain Server
Authentication 
Management
Component
Kerberos / LDAP / LAN
To be 
deployed
To be 
developed
for each 
AML
Browser Client
Web Browser
Database Server
AML
Database
ODBC / LAN
GRIA AML Module
HTTPS / LAN
Application Server
Web App Container
AML Case Manager
Module
Bank Y Bank X
SOAP/ HTTPS / LAN 
SOAP / HTTPS / LAN
Rich Client
(Windows or Linux)
GRIA GUI
Fig. 3 A typical deployment diagram of the basic components
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agreement defined in the SLA. It provides the ability for a client (with an
existing account) to view the available SLA templates, propose an SLA
and for the client and service provider to monitor and manage SLAs.
○ The GRIA AML Service: the AML Service provides a secure and managed
front-end to the service Bank’s existing AML system. It allows a client
(with a valid SLA) to query the service bank for certain pieces of
information regarding their customers for the purposes of AML.
○ A web browser client for monitoring and managing the GRIA services
through their web interfaces.
Client (Bank Y)
○ Standard AML software components.
○ The Domain Server is shown in Bank Y along with the module used for
authentication purposes. The client software must integrate with this existing
authentication mechanism.
The additional components required by the current solution are:
○ The GRIA GUI Client: may be used to manage GRIA Trade Accounts and
SLAs. Ultimately it may be that these use cases are dealt with by further
integration with the client AML software, but as they are very infrequent it
is not required.
○ A GRIA AML Module integrated in the AML product portal (or to the
AML GUI Client) to interface to the AML Service.
An important part of this solution is to design a system that allows different AML
systems to interoperate and so generic AML products are shown at both the client and
the service provider bank . The design makes this easy by limiting the integration
between the basic components and the AML system to two well-defined points:
1. The GRIA AML Service: for a different AML system at the service bank a
different back-end to the AML Service would be written to obtain the necessary
information from the AML system. The web service interface would remain the
same to ensure compatibility.
2. Client side: on the client, the integration point is between the AML portal and
the GRIA client libraries. As will be seen, the number of different interactions
the client AML software will make with the system is quite small so this does
not represent a significant problem.
What needs to be deployed and what needs to be developed for every different
AML system can be seen in the following Component diagram (Fig. 3), having
marked with special colours the components needed for AMONG:
Although the overview of the scenario presented in Fig. 2 seems quite simple, all
the additional components shown in Fig. 3 are required to provide the security and
management aspects of the system.
GRIA trust and security
The system requirements are fully covered by GRIA. GRIA components were
designed specifically for business to business relationship management using
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bipartite agreements, localised security and management control. GRIA components
may also be used to implement more traditional centralised VOs though they are
lacking some management tools that can make this easy.
As mentioned, Identity Management and authentication are very important in
AMONG. GRIA services and the GRIA client share the same trust and security
system. All these services and their resources are protected in the same way, and
require authentication for each client program. In a managed GRIA deployment, the
client cannot do anything until they have a valid trade account. The client must apply
for an account and (commonly) the service provider approves the account manually.
The service provider might for also perform a credit check on the client or confirm
his identity in some way, because although he will be identified by his X.509
credentials (Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile,
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2459.txt), GRIA does not have a list of trusted certificate
authorities (CAs), instead anyone can be approved with his credentials being trusted
thereafter. This process is very important because once the service provider approves
a trade account he is permitting the client to obtain SLAs and use the services
without any further manual intervention. It is this manual approval step that is the
most important function of the service, in order to secure the whole process, without
actually harming the flexibility. The accounting for usage is optional and depends
upon whether the SLAs provided by the SLA service actually include any charges.
Furthermore, the currency used by the Account Service and SLA Service does not
have to be a real currency; it can be some sort of token and used as a high level
count of usage rather than cost.
All messages sent through GRIA between the client and the service are digitally
signed following the WS-Security standard (Web Service Security specification,
WS-Security, Soap Message Security, Available from: http://docs.oasis-open.org/
wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0.pdf) to ensure the mes-
sage integrity. In addition, the messages are usually transmitted over an HTTPS
transport to encrypt the contents and prevent eavesdropping.
The GRIA service infrastructure includes an implementation of the standard
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Information
Point (PIP) and Policy Administration Point (PAP) design pattern (Secure Service
PDP. http://grid.ece.ntua.gr/NextGRIDWiki/index.php/Secure_Service_PDP) using
GRIA-specific interfaces, along with a service and resource security state model
defined in XML. This provides a dynamic security system for resources where
access control rules can be added and removed by authorized persons and a static
policy for the service and resources defining which operations are available to clients
of which role when the service or resource is in each state. For instance, the policy
for the query resource would state that the getRisk operation could only be used by a
client with the owner role when the resource was in the IRSMatch state. The client
would obtain the owner role through matching an access control rule that specified
that he could be an owner.
Finally, as mentioned, a long-term Service Level Agreement between the two
banks limits the number of queries performed per day, in order to avoid “phishing
attacks” from the querying bank. For the purposes of monitoring the SLAs’ usage,
an SLA Violation Notifier tool, developed in the context of BEinGRID project as
well, dispatches notifications regarding SLA query limit breaches to all interested
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parties. To receive notifications, an interested party must subscribe to a notification
system, implemented in the SLA Service of GRIA. Each subscription consists of a
specific SLA the subscriber is interested in and a web service URL to which the
notification will be sent. Only authorised users can subscribe to these notifications.
Each time a new query by Bank Y overcomes a specific limit, the constraint manager
of GRIA will create a NotifyAction instance and execute it, resulting in a notify
operation being invoked in the AML services subscribed to this SLA (Bank YAML
Service and/or Bank X AML Service). This way Chief Compliance Officers (CCOs)
of the two banks can get feedback on the SLA resource usage and maybe renegotiate
the SLA terms with other banks if the number of queries frequently reaches the
agreed limit (Fig. 4).
Evaluation—stress tests
The basic objectives of AMONG were achieved, building a trustful and efficient
platform, enabling different AML Systems to collaborate securely. The expected
evaluation on the AML efficiency and the increased AML success rates will be done
in the long term by Financial Institutions adopting the solution. Since a pilot
program is already built, the System is expected to go commercial at the beginning
of 2010, when a Beta version will be ready. However, before the platform is adopted
by banking groups, the system must be put into some kind of “stress tests”, in order
to validate that the system can cope with extreme operational circumstances:
Interoperability: Interoperability is a major requirement of AMONG, as the
System must interoperate with different AML software installed on different
platforms (Windows or Linux). The MoneyWatch AML software, which was
initially used, operates only on Windows Server. Using the VMWare application,
:ConstraintManager
create(resource EPR)
:NotifyAction
execute
GRIA AML 
Service
*notify
Fig. 4 When an SLA limit is reached, the ConstraintManager creates a NotifyAction
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however, it was successfully deployed on Linux via a Windows Virtual Machine, a
case that can be realized for AML applications working on any operating system.
Security and Authentication: As mentioned, the Identity Management and
authentication are really crucial, especially when exchanging customer personal
information. However, even if there was undesirable access to the data transported
from end to end, by providing Transport Layer Security through https connection
the decryption of the data was made practically impossible in real time, using any
kind of brute force. GRIA services issue X.509 certificates based on users’ local
Kerberos or Active Directory credentials and nobody else can be identified as a
user, without having a specific keystore stored in his client folders.
Dynamicity: Checking the dynamicity of managing the SLA lifecycle, we
tested the GRIA SLA Service having different usage constraints in the SLA
(e.g. running activities) and changed the billing tariff many times, adding
more bands and requiring more notifications (different each time) to be sent
by the Monitoring and Evaluation component.
Scalability: As a scalability test, the system operated normally having many
collaborating banks and performing parallel queries to all of them for an
investigated client.
Conclusions
The AMONG platform delivers mainly business benefits and is indented to be
exploited as a market product by the end-user of the developing consortium, which
is a bank. Therefore, an evaluation of the system by means of benchmarking the
performance of AMONG is of very small value. The use in real-time conditions is
going to produce clear indications as to whether the system will deliver what is
promised. This, involves a business risk that the bank partner (end-user in the phase
of development) is willing to take by using it for intra-banking purposes, that is, by
testing AMONG’s performance within the group of banks that operate under the
same brand name. The testing will take place in a comparative manner by using
AMONG in parallel with the existing standalone AMLs systems. However, in the
phase of development the AMONG system was tested so as to mainly guarantee that
the requirements (both functional and non-functional) have been met. For this
reason, the money laundering systems and the databases of two banks were
simulated using existing AML market products and actual bank databases that were
anonymized and the data scrambled. At the end, the aggregation of heterogeneous
information systems (different AML products) is feasible in the frame of AMONG
as the layer of their interfaces is abstracted by the Grid service layer
& High-end Grid security components are providing increased security throughout the
whole flow of information that is exchanged between heterogeneous systems and data
& The SLA enforcement, along with security provides a trust enforcement
framework for effective business collaboration
& Identity of customer is not compromised at any stage of the business process
& Identity management is done through sophisticated Grid security components
delivered by GRIA
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Moreover, the undeniable business benefits AMONG are:
& Holistic viewpoint of the AML environment: COs understand that a holistic
viewpoint can provide a clearer picture of a Money Launderer’s activities.
Moreover, the risk of identifying a client as a potential Money Launderer is —if
not reduced— distributed among the trusted network of banks.
& The broadening of the market: Insurance companies, casinos and other
businesses have to apply procedures that encompass enhanced due diligence and
KYC processes. An extensible solution can be widely accepted by the target
market, as long as pricing modification accompany the technical ones.
On a different notion, another approach for all bank to bank communications
would be to go through a central trusted third party with no direct bank to bank
communication at all. This hub and spoke model has the advantage of simple
configuration and management at each bank (only a single relationship to
manage) and also provides the ability to anonymise any requests so that a bank
providing an AML service does not know which other bank is running a
particular query.
However, there are two disadvantages of this model:
1. Banks may want to control their relationships with other banks, permitting or
blocking access on a case per case basis. This is possible in this model but not as
direct as when each bank controls its relationships through bipartite SLAs.
2. Currently, there is no suitable trusted third party. It may be that in the future, the
central bank or financial services authority could play this role.
A halfway house between the simplicity of having a single agreement with a
central third party and the relative complexity of each bank managing
agreements with another bank is to keep the bipartite agreements between
banks, but standardise the arrangements through a third party so that the
management is simpler. That is, each bank wishing to cooperate over AML could
join a consortium and sign up to legal agreements standardising their relation-
ships with the other consortium members. The third party could then provide the
services necessary to help manage a bank’s relationships with the other banks,
such as a central identity authority and registry of SLA templates. The main
disadvantages of this method are that:
1. Banks may want to evaluate their AML systems and credibility differently
depending on who is the other collaborating bank. This might result in different
pricing policies in each collaboration, taking into consideration the risk of
collaborating with a certain partner.
2. Banks entering in a collaboration through a trusted third party make themselves
liable to the credibility of a great number of other banks the participation of which
may not be able to control. Given that money laundering is not illegal for the banks
themselves but it is for the society (the money launderer who uses bank products is
basically making money for the bank) it might be the case that some banks are
allured by the probability of making money and are willing to take the risk.
Therefore, a bank needs to be very sure about which bank do they choose as their
collaborator, something not very easy through trusted third party solutions.
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